RECENT CASES.
ATTORNEY AT LAw-LIEN-An attorney who was presenting a case for a
contingent fee agreed to give certain other attorneys one-third of such fee,
if and when he should receive it, if they would do certain work for him.
Held: This contract created a lien on the fund as soon as he received it,
in favor of his promisees who had performed the agreed services. Barnes v.
Alexander, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276 (1913).
In De Winter v. Thomas, 34 App. D. C. 8o (igog), the court made a
distinction in -this line of cases between agreements for a certain fee to be
paid out of the fund recovered and agreements merely for a sum equal to a
certain percentage of the fund recovered or for a certain amount in case of
recovery. In the former class, it held that a lien was created while in the
latter, the contract was merely personal and there was no lien. This shadowy
distinction resulted from the decision of Trist v. Child, 88 U. S. 44i (1894),
which had stated that ordinarily a contingent fee depended on a personal
promise and gave no specific lien against the fund recovered.
In the principal case, the court was confronted with Trist v. Child, supra,
and Wylie v. Coxe, 56 U. S. 415 (1853), an earlier decision, directly contra
to Trist v. Child. The court, deciding to follow Wylie v. Coxe, distinguished
Trist v. Child on the ground that the contract in that case was illegal and
all remarks as to its effect as a lien were therefore merely obiter dicta.
In support of its conclusion, it cited Ingersoll v. Corain, 211 U. S. 335 (1908),
which cites the previous decisions.
The distinction laid down in De Winter v. Thomas, supra, has not been
followed, the principal case being in accord with the general decisions. Smith
v. Young, 62 Ill. 210 (1871) ; Wilson v. Seeber, 72 N. J. E. 523 (I9o7); Costigan v. Stewart, 76 Kan. 353 (907) ; see cases cited in 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634.
For a discussion as to the general effect and purpose of retaining and
charging liens by attorneys, see I Loyd's Cases on Civil Procedure, 247, 248;
Mechem's Agency, §86o, et seq.
CONTRACTS-OFFER

AND ACCEPTANCE-MONTHS-An

offer given on Sep-

tember 2oth and to be open for one month is automatically withdrawn, unless
accepted before the eighteenth of October, that date marking the end of a
lunar month. Morrell v. Studd & Millington, iog L. T. Rep. 628 (Eng. 1913).
At common law, a month is a lunar month, unless otherwise expressed.
Bruner v. Moore, 89 L. T. Rep. 738 (Eng. i9o4). If the context implies that
calendar months were intended, they will be used as the measure of time
between the parties. Regina v. Chawton, 4 P. & D. 525 (Eng. I84r). In
mercantile transactions in the City of London, calendar months are always
intended. Turner v. Barlow, 3 F. & F. 946 (Eng. 1863). In the ecclesiastical
courts, calendar months were intended unless otherwise expressed. Bruner
v. Moore, supra. The word "month" as used in statutes was always a lunar
month, Lacon v. Hooper, 6 Term, 226 (Eng. 1795) ; until changed by statute
to mean calendar months unless otherwise expressed. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21
(Eng. 1850).
Two American States have always held that the word "months" always
referred to calendar months unless it is the clear intention of the parties
that other months were intended. Shapley v. Garey, 6 S. & R. 539 (Pa. 1821) ;
Churchill v. Merchants' Bank, 19 Cush. 532 (Mass. 1837). The same rule
applies to the word as used in statutes or other matters. Commonwealth v.
Chambre, 4 Dall. T43 (Pa. 1794); Avery v. PixleY, 4 Mass. 459 (i8o8).
Authority can be found to support the use of lunar months in statutes, State
(466)
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v. Jacobs, 2 Harr. 548 (Del. x838); Rivers v. Guthrie, 46 N. C. 84 (1853).
In New York, lunar months were intended, unless otherwise expressed in all
matters, Leffingwell v. White, i Johns. Cas. 99i (N. Y. I799) ;-Loring v.
Halling, i5 Johns. Ii9 (N. Y. 1818). A statute declares that calendar months
shall now be intended when the word is used in statutes or in dealings between man and man, or wherever the word is used, unless it is the clear
intent that lunar months are meant. i Rev. Stat. (606) 615 (N. Y. i83o).
Ordinarily, calendar months are meant wherever used unless otherwise expressed or to be implied. Waterville v. Barton, 64 Me. 321 (1874) ;,Sheets v.
Selden, 69 U. S. i77 (.864). A Texas case holds that in criminal matters
a month is a solar month of thirty days, this being the only means of insuring uniformity. McKinney v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 387 (1902).
CARIms--NEGLIGENcE-Wno ARE PASSENGERS ?-The porter of the Pullman Company was injured while engaged in the service of that company in
the sleeping car. The Pullman Company had agreed with the defendant railroad company that its employees should have no cause of action for injuries
resulting from the defendants' negligence and the porter had ratified this
agreement in his contract of service and assumed all the risks of the employment. Held: The porter could recover. Coleman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 89
At. Rep. 87 (Pa. 1913).

The general rule is that a common carrier cannot limit its liability by
a stipulation in the contract of carriage by which a' passenger is to take the
risk of its negligence. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keeper, 146 Ind. 21 (1896);
Doyle v. Fitchburg R. Co., i66 Mass. 492 (1896). But no common law duty
requires a railroad to transport with its passenger trains, cars specially adapted
to the exclusive use of express or sleeping car companies. Peterson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., iig Wis. 197 (i903); Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hamler,
215 Ill. 525 (Io5) ; Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Whan, 89 Pac. Rep. 39 (Col. I9O7).
And, accordingly, it is not a common carrier of $uch cars and employees performing duties therein. Robertson v. Old Colony R. Co., 156 Mass. 525
(i892); McDermon v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 122"Fed. Rep. 669 (i9o3). Therefore, if it does undertake to receive and haul the cars of an express or sleeping car company, it may stipulate how far its liability for negligence shall
extend. Long v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 870 (1904); Robinson
v. St. Johnsbury, etc., R. Co., 66 Ad. Rep. 814 (Vt. i9o7).
This doctrine has, however, as in the principal case, been rejected by the
courts of a few States. Jones v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 125 Mo. 666 (1894);
Sharon v. Ches. & 0. R. Co., 104 Va. 645 (19o3) ; Davis v. Ches. & 0. R. Co.,
29 Ky. L. Rep. 53 (igo6). The Supreme Court of the United States has given
its sanction to it in the leading case of B. & 0. S. W. R. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U. S.
498 (i899). And a great majority of the courts where the question has been
adjudicated are in accord in their acceptance of the doctrine.
The courts differ as to whether the employee of a sleeping car company
is chargeable with notice of a contract between his employer and the railroad company exempting the latter from liability for negligence. It was- held
in the following cases that the employee was chargeable with notice. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney, 148 Ind. 196 (1897); Long v. Lehigh Valley
R. Co., 13o Fed. Rep. 87o (1904). But actual knowledge of agreement was
required in order to bind the employee. Brewer v. New York, etc., R. Co.,
124 N. Y. 59 (i89i); Robinson v. St. Johnsbury, etc., R. Co., supra.
CARRi:sE-TAICABS-PASSENGER ASSAULTED BY EMPLOYEE-A passenger
in a taxicab, having been told by the company's superintendent that the fare
to a certain place would be $3.70, on arriving at his destination refused to
pay the $5.oo demanded by the chauffeur; whereupon the chauffeur assaulted
him and had him arrested. Held: The company is liable to the passenger
for the assault committed by its chauffeur. Van Hoefen v. Columbia Taxicab Co., 162 S. W. Rep. 694 (Mo. 1913).
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This is the first case in which a taxicab company has been directly held to
be a common carrier, although the conclusion seems to be sufficiently obvious,
since a taxicab company differs in no essential from a company operating horse
drawn hacks, which have always been held common carriers, Parmelee v.
Lowitz, 74 Ill. 116 (1874) ; and it fulfills the necessary requisites of undertaking for hire to transport such persons as chose to employ it, from place
to place. Dwight v. Brewster, 18 Mass. 5o (1822); Hutchinson on Carriers
(3rd Ed.), §47. As a common carrier, the taxicab company owes a high
degree of duty to its passengers, not only to protect them from negligence
of employees while in the performance of their duty, Crofts v. Waterhouse,
3 Bing. 319 (Eng. 1825); and from assaults by third persons which could
reasonably have been anticipated, Connells v. Railroad, 93 Va. 44 (i896) ; but
to insure the passenger against any assaults or abuse on the part of its
servants, and even though the servant has seemingly departed from his duty
and assaulted a passenger, the carrier is responsible for it. Neuer v. St.
Ry. Co., 143 Mo. App. 4o2 (igio); Cole v. Railroad Co., io2 Ga. 474 (1897);
Chicago R. R. v. Flexman, io3 Ill. 546 (1882).
CONmAacTs-AcCORD AND SATIsFAcTION-A debtor sent to a creditor a
cheque in payment of an undisputed part of a claim, stating that the cheque
was sent in full satisfaction, there being a dispute as to the balance of the
claim. The creditor cashed the cheque and notified the debtor that he placed
the sum on account. Held: The creditor could recover the balance from
the debtor. Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply, io3 N. E.
Rep. 695 (Mass. 1913).

Most American courts hold as matter of law that the retention of a sum
sent as full satisfaction of a disputed claim operates as an accord and satisfaction. Conn. River Lumber Co. v. Brown, 68 Vt. 239 (895); Harlow v.
Wilkensburg, I89 Pa. 443 (1899); San Juan v. St. Johns Gas Co., i95 U. S.
510 (19o4).

However, the offer of the payment of a less sum than claimed

must be accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount to a condition, that if it is accepted it is to be in full satisfaction. Washington Gas
Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576 (i888); Dentman v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. App.
624 (i89i). The English courts leave it to the jury to decide whether the
creditor accepted the cheque in final settlement 6r merely as a payment on
account Day v. McLea, 22 Q. B. D. 61o (Eng. 1889).
There is a conflict of authority as to whether the payment of a portion of
the claim conceded to be due will constitute a satisfaction for the release
of the remainder which is disputed. It was held in the following cases
that a creditor in such a case is barred. Ostrander v. Scott, i61 Ill. 339
(1896); Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326 (1896). But, as in the principal case, the contrary position is taken in a number of jurisdictions. Weidner v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 13o Wis. 1o (i9o6) ; Demeules'v.
Jewel Tea Co., io3 Minn. 15o (i9o8); Braham v. Bank of Delight, 126 S. W.
Rep. 394 (Ark. i9IO). The payment, however, of one claim conceded to be
due is not a consideration for an alleged accord and satisfaction of another
and distinct claim which is disputed. Watson '. Calkins & Co., 1I9 Ia. 150
(i9o3); Mance v. Hossington, 2o5 N. Y. 33 (1912).
CONTRACTS-INToxicATIoN-The plaintiff executed a deed at a time when

he was so under the influence- of liquor as to be wholly unable to understand
the nature of the deed which he signed. He filed a petition for the cancellation of the deed. Held: The deed is voidable and may be avoided by the
plaintiff himself. Coody v. Coody, 136 Pac. Rep. 754 (Okl. 1913).
A drunkard when in a complete state of intoxication so as not to know
what he is doing has no capacity to contract. Wright v. Walter, 127 Ala.
557 (igoo) ; Martin v. Harsh, 231 Ill. 384 (1907). It is not necessary, however, that he should be able to act wisely or discreetly, nor to effect a good
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bargain, but he must at least know what he is about. Bliss v. Conn. R. R.
Co., 24 Vt 424 (1852); Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill. io8 (1874). The courts differ
as to whether a contract made by a person who is drunk, so as to be incapable of understanding its effect, is void or voidable. The general tendency
is to consider the contract as only voidable. Matthews v. Baxter, L. R. 8
Exch. 132 (Eng. 1873); Strickland v. Parlin, i8 Ga. 213 (i9o3); Fowler v.
Meadow Brook Water Co., 208 Pa. 473 (19o4). A number of authorities
take the ground that a contract made at such a time is wholly void. Taylor
v. Purcell, 6o Ark 6o6 (895) ; Cameron v. Liglt Co., 138 N. C. 365 (igo.g).
In general a contract made with an intoxicated person is voidable where
an unfair advantage has been obtained by reason of the intoxication. Wilcox
v. Jackson, 51 Ia. 208 (1879) ; Melson v. Lafflin, 21 N. Y. S. 731 (0893). And
a contract procured from a drunken person where such intoxication is purposely caused by the other party is held invalid. Knelkamp v. Hidding, 31
Wis. 5o3 (1872) ; Lyon V. Phillips, io6 Pa. 57 (1884). But a contract that
is invalid by reason of the drunkenness may be ratified by the drunkard
when he becomes sober and if so ratified, it will be enforced. Bush v. Brenig,
ix3 Pa. 310 (i886); Carpenter v. Rogers, 61 Mich. 384 (1886). This is true
where the contracts are regarded as voidable only, not void and therefore
capable of being ratified when the party becomes sober. Johnson V. Harmon,
94 U. S. 371 (1876). In some jurisdictions, where an intoxicated person contracts with one who is ignorant of his condition, if the contract be fair and
has been so far executed that the parties cannot be replaced in status quo,
it will be treated as binding. Kneedler's Appeal, 92 Pa. 428 (188o) ; Insurance Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541 (i88O); Fay v. Burditt, 81 Ind. 433 ('x882).
For a further discussion, see Intoxication as a Defense to an Express Contract, 62 U. OF P. L. R, 34 (Nov. 1913).
CONTRA s-Nudum Pactuin--Two men orally agreed to purchase certain land, one was to pay for it from the proceeds of a loan secured by him
upon the joint security of this purchased land and other land of his own,
and was to take title in his own name and to convey a half interest to the
other when the rents, issues and profits of the purchased land had reimbursed him for the purchase price. Upon failing to carry out this promise to
convey the other brought suit. Held: The agreement was a nudum Pactum and
therefore unenforceable. Hall v. Edwards, 79 S. E. Rep. 852 (Ga. 1913).
This ig a universal rule of contracts that unless a seal is present a consideration is necessary; that is, as a general definition, some benefit to the promisor, or some loss or detriment to the promisee. Kephart v. Buddieke, 2o Col.
App. 546 (x9o6) ; Chase v. Chase, 191 Mass. 556 (i9o6) ; Graham v. Spence, 63
A. 344 (N. J. Ch. i9o6); Hess' Estate, i5o Pa. S. 346 (1892); Bigelow v.
Bigelow, 95 Me. 17 (19oi). The benefit alone or the detriment alone is sufficient. County Court v. Hall, 5I W. Va. 269 (I92); McKinley v. Wilson, 96
S. W. 112 (Tex. i9o6); Leaming v. Duryea, 97 N. Y. S. 355 (1906). A
promise made under a sense of moral obligation is not binding. Thompson
v. Thompson, 78 N. Y. S. 389 (19o2); Valentine v. Foster, 42 Mass. 520
(184o); Updike v. True, 13 N. J. Eq. 151 (I86O), nor one made upon past
consideration, Perkins v. Smith, 81 N. Y. S. 955 (io3); Cleaver v. LenIt makes no difference that one to whom a
hart, 182 Pa. St. 285 (897).
naked promise was made has suffered damage through relying or acting upon
it. Bragg v. Danielson, 141 Mass. 195 (i886); Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84
(N. Y. i8og).
CONTEMPT OF COURT-CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT-INFLUENCING Jutoa-The
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages suffered by reason of construction
and operation of a trolley road over his property. While jury were on a
street car, returning from an inspection of the premises in question, which
had been ordered by the court, a witness who had assisted in the preparation
of the plaintiff's case, engaged a juryman in conversation and for the purpose of prejudicing the juror against the defendant's superintendent. Hild:
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The witness was guilty of a constructive contempt of court, since his act,though not done in the presence of the court, tended to obstruct the administration of the justice. Greason v. Cumberland Ry. Co., 242 Pa. 595 (1913).
It is probable that, if it had not been necessary for the court to construe the Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784, which provided that punishment
by imprisonment be confined to contempts "in open court" and that all other
contempts be punished by fine only, the Act would have been regarded as an
actual and not a constructive contempt. The court cites with approval the
decision in Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267 (i889), in which it is stated that
"the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set
apart for its use and for the use of its officers, jurors and witnesses; and
misbehavoir anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the
court."
All wilful attempts to influence jurors improperly in the impartial discharge of their duties, whether by conversations or discussions or attempts to
bribe, are contempts. In re Gorham, 129 N. C. 481 (I9OI) ; Nichols v. Judge
Super. Ct., 89 N. W. Rep. 691 (Mich. 19o2). Discussion of his case by
a litigant in the presence of veniremen, who may serve as jurors therein, is
a contempt. Baker v. State, 82 Ga. 776 (1889). While any attempt to control action of grand jury is contempt, a mere inquiry of a grand juror as to
what has taken place in relation to a particular case is not. Harwell v. State,
78 Tenn. 544 (1882). However, it has been held that an attempt by a newspaper reporter to obtain information regarding the deliberations of a jury
by eavesdropping is a contempt. Orman v. State, 24 Tex. App. 495 (1887).
So, also, a party to an arrangement that a juryman give a signal in regard to
the likelihood of the jury not agreeing upon a verdict, so that a bet could
be made on the result, was adjudged in contempt. State v. Doty, 32 N. J. L.
403 (I868).
COPOAIToNs-DiviDENsD---RIGHT
MAINDERMAN-In

re Osborne,

1O3

TO

BETWEEN

LIFE-TENANT AND

RE-

N. E. Rep. 723 (N. Y. 1913) holds: (i)

Ordinary dividends, regardless of the time when the surplus out of which
they are payable was accumulated, should be paid to the life beneficiary of
the trust; (2) extraordinary dividends, payable. from the accumulated earnings of the company, whether payable in cash or stock, belong to the life
beneficiary, unless they intrench in whole or in part upon the capital of the
trust fund as received from the testator or maker of the trust or invested
in the stock, in which case such extraordinary dividends should be returned
to the trust fund or apportioned between the trust fund and the life beneficiary in such a way as to preserve the integrity of the trust fund.
When a stock or extraordinary cash dividend is declared upon shares
held in trust, or owned in such a way that one person has an estate therein for
life and another person the remainder over, there at once arises a dispute
between the life-tenant and the remainderman. Of course, if testator or
maker of trust has expressed his intention, it must be carried out, Re Robinson's Trust, 218 Pa. 481 (1907), so far as it does not result in an unlawful
accumulation of income. Where he has failed to express any clear intention,
the difficulty arises. As far back as 1799, in England, it was established as
a rule that all extraordinary or unusual dividends declared during the continuation of a life estate, whether payable in cash or in stock, belong to the
corpus of the fund and not to the income. Brander v. Brander, 4 Ves. Jr.
8oo (1799). This rule has been materially modified, and dividends of cash
are now held to belong to the life-tenant and stock dividends to the reinainderman, subject, perhaps, to an examination of the facts and circumstances in each case. Bouch v. Sproule, L.-R. 12 App. Cas. 385 (Eng. 1887).
Another view is to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and
stock dividends, whenever earned and however declared, as capital. Minot v.
Payne, 99 Mass. 10 (1868). In subsequent cases this rule has been affirmed
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and elaborated. Daland v. Williams, ioi Mass. 571 (1869). However, the
court in deciding whether the distribution is a stock or a cash dividend, may
consider the actual and substantial character of the transaction, and not its
"nominal character merely. D'Ooge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558 (goo).
It was held in Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857), that ordinary dividends
on stock held in trust belong to the person entitled to the income of the
trust fund, but that extraordinary dividends should be apportioned between
the life-tenant and the remainderman in accordance with the amount thereof
accumulated before and after the creation of the trust. This equitable rule
prevails not only in Pennsylvania, but also in many other jurisdictions, and
may well be called the American rule. Day v. Faulks, 79 N. J. Eq. 66 (1911) ;
Goodwin v. McGaughy, fo8 Minn. ig (igog); Coudon v. Updegraff, 117 Md.
71 (i912). It is the rule adopted by the New York Court in our principal
case.
CORPORATIONS-NEGoTIABILITY OF STOCK CERTIFICATE-A certificate of
-stock issued by a corporation, with a form of assignment and power of
attorney to make the necessary transfer printed on the back, which had-been
signed in blank by the owner, was pledged by the owner, as security for a
loan, to a bank, whose cashier embezzled the certificate and sold it to a purchaser for value without notice. Held: Such certificate was not a negotiable instrument, and that the title of the true owner was not divested by
a sale by the thief to a purchaser for value. Barstow v. City Trust Co., IO3
N. E. Rep. 9ii (Mass. 1914).
It is a well established rule of the common law that certificates of stock
are not negotiable instruments. A certificate of stock is not a promise to
pay money, nor has it any of the essentials of a negotiable instrument. It
has been repeatedly decided by the courts that a certificate of stock is not
negotiable, and no custom of trade or brokers can give it that character.
Hammond v. Hastings, 134 U. S. 401 (i8go); Mechanics Bank v. N. Y. &c.
P- R. Co., 13 N. Y. 599 (I856); Farmers' Bank v. Diebold Co., 66 Ohio St.
367 (1902); Barstow v. Savage Co., 64 Cal. 388 (883); Clark v. American
Coal Co., 86 Ia. 436 (1892) ; Baker v. Davie, 211 Mass. 429 (I912) ; Schumacher
v. Greene Co., 117 Minn. 124 (1912). Nevertheless, the New York Court
of Appeals has well said that while certificates of stock are not negotiable
in form and represent no debt and are not securities for money, yet "the
courts of this country, in view of the extensive dealing in certificates of
shares in corporate enterprises, and the interest, both of the public and of the
corporation which issues them, in making them readily transferable and convertible, have given to them some of the elements of negotiability." Knox
v. Eden Musee Co., 148 N. Y. 441 (1896). Many courts have said that 4
stock certificate is a quasi negotiable instrument; but that is not a very happy
term, and conveys no definite meaning. •
In England, an entirely different rule prevails. Certificates of stock in
that country are merely evidences of owpership of stock, and are not negotiable nor quasi negotiable. The purcha~er is not protected against equities involved in the title of prior owners of the certificate. Colonial Bank v. Cady
L. R. is App. Cas. 267 (Eng. i89o). It has been recently held in England,
however, that a certificate of fully-paid-up stock running to "bearer" was
negotiable and if stolen and sold to a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice, the latter gets a good title. Webb Co. v. Alexandria Co., Ltd., 93 L. T.
339 (Eng. 19o5).
The trend of modern decisions has been to encourage the free circulation of stock certificates, on the theory that they are a valuable aid to commercial transactions, and that the public interest is best subserved by removing all restrictions against their circulation, and by placing them as nearly
as possible on the plane of commercial paper. This tendency is evidenced
by- the adoption by many States of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, §5 of
which gives full negotiability to certificates of stock.

472

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDER TO INSPECT BooKs-A writ of
nandamus was issued against a corporation to compel it to permit one of

its stockholders to examine its stock books, under a statute providing that,
before every stockholders' meeting, all corporations shall open their stock
books and stockholders' lists for the inspection of their stockholders. In its
return to the writ, the corporation maintained that the relator's motive was
not to protect his interest as stockholder, but rather to trade in the corporate shares for his personal benefit and at the expense of the other stockholders, and that he was a broker and intended to use the stockholders' list
for his own business purposes. Held: The demurrer to the return was
proper and the corporation ordered to permit the inspection regardless of
the motive. State ex rel. Costello v. Middlesex Banking Co., 88 Atl. Rep.
86i (Conn. 1913).

The privilege to inspect the books and papers of a corporation is a
common law privilege incident to the ownership of corporate stock. This
privilege becomes a right when the purpose of the stockholder desiring to
make the inspection is germane to his interest as stockholder, proper and
lawful in its character, not inimical to the corporate interests and the application is made at a proper time. Stone v. Kellogg, 62 Ill. App. 444 (1895) ;
Kuhbach v. Irving, etc., Co., 220 Pa. 427 (1908); Com. v. Phoenix Iron Co.,
io5 Pa. 11

(1884); In re Hastings, io6 N. Y. S. 938 (1907); Varney v.

Baker, i94 Mass. 239 (1907) ; 4 Thompson on Corporations, §4515. The legislatures of many States have by special enactment enlarged this common law
right, as in the principal case; in other States it has been confined or restricted. Bay State Gas Co. v. State, 4 Penn. 238 (Del. 1902); State v.
National, etc., Co., 69 N. J. L. i98 (19o3); Garvin v. Pacific, etc., Union, 2
Cal. App. 638 (i9o6).
Where the right of inspection is conferred by statute in special terms, the
purpose or motive of the stockholder in making a demand for an inspection
is immaterial unless it is unlawful; and he cannot, therefore, be compelled
to state his reasons for desiring an inspection. State v. Middlesex Banking
Co., supra; In re Weiss, 62 N. Y. S. 145 (igoo); State v. Sportsman's Park
Assn., 29 Mo. App. 326 (1888). His clear legal right conferred upon him by
the statute cannot be defeated by questioning his motives in using it. Johnson
v. Langdon, 135 Cal. 624 (I9O2).
COVENANTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-A canvasser entered into a contract
of employment with the plaintiff company wherein he covenanted that he
would not within three years after the termination of his engagement with
the plaintiff "be in the employ of any person or persons, firm or firms, company or companies, carrying on or engaged in a business the same as or
similar to that of the" plaintiff "within twenty-five miles of London aforesaid, where the company carry on business." Held: The restriction was
greater than was reasonably necessary for the protection of the plaintiff's
business and was void. Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., iog

L. T. Rep. 449 (Eng. 1913).

Contracts by employees, ancillary to contracts of employment, restricting
their right to labor along the same lines, either for themselves or others,
upon the termination of their present employment, are not favored in the
law. Where such contracts unreasonably limit the employees' right to pursue their trade or occupation in the future, they are held to violate public
policy because the covenantor's means for procuring a livelihood for himself
and family are thereby diminished. He is deprived of the power of usefulness, and the public is deprived of the benefit of the exercise by him, of his
knowledge and skill. Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (1866); Carroll v. Giles,
30 S. C. 412 (1888) ; Hinde v. Gray, I M. & G. io5 (Eng. I84O).

The law is well stated in the leading English case of Nordenfelt v. MaximNordenfelt Guns Co., 71 L. T. Rep. 499 (Eng. 1894). In Carter v. Ailing,
43 Fed. Rep. 2o8 (i8go), it is said that the rule is that an employer has a
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right to bind an employee not to go into the employ of a competitor for a
reasonable time after his employment terminates, within the territory where
the employer seeks his market; and whether such covenant is reasonable
and binding is a judicial question which must depend in each case upon its
peculiar facts and circumstances. The restraint, in order to be valid, must
be only such as is necessary to afford a fair protection to the party in favor
of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of
the public. Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370 (i89i). The reasonableness of a restriction in a contract is the test of its validity. Tillinghast v.
Boothby, 20 R.I. 59 (897) ; and this reasonableness is strictly a question for
the court itself; the. courts have steadily refused to allow the question of
reasonableness to be decided by a jury. Mason v. Provident Co., supra;
Carter v. Alling, supra.
. An agreement by a solicitor of a tea company not to engage in the same
business in the city where he solicits, for a period of two years after the
termination of his employment was held reasonable and valid. Hoopes Tea
Co. v. Dorsey, 99 Ill. App. i81 (ipoo). The following agreements were also
held valid and reasonable: Agreement by commercial traveler not to travel
over same route for any other firm, Mumford v. Gething, 7 C. B. N. S. 305
(Eng. 1859); agreement by canvasser for customers of ice company, not to
engage in the same business on the same route, or five squares therefrom for
one year after termination of employment, American Ice Co. v. Lynch, 7o
Atl. Rep. 138 (N. J. I9o8); agreement by solicitor of milk concern not to
engage in any way, either directly or indirectly, in a similar business within
three miles of a certain street for twenty-four months after the termination
of his employment, Benwell v. Inns, 24 Beav. 307 (Eng. 1857); agreement
by similar employee not to engage in such business in a certain city for one
year after termination of his employment, Erie County Milk Co. v. Ripley,
18 Pa. Sup. Ct 28 (igoi); agreement by traveling salesman for manufacturing company not to enter the employ of any competitor, during a
period of three years, anywhere within a radius of X500 miles of the city
of Chicago, Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 304 (9o2) ; agreement by traveling salesman for manufacturing concern not to enter the employ of any competitor for three years after termination of his employment,
Carter v. Alling, 43 Fed. 2o8 (i89o).
CRIhINAL LAw-BURGLARY-SUBSEQUENT CoNucT-Action for breaking
into house with intent to commit rape and, in rebuttal of evidence that the
prisoner was -in the house with the consent of the prosecutrix, evidence is
offered that an hour after he left the house of the prosecutrix he entered
the house of another woman and there had intercourse with her with her
consent. Held: The evidence of the later crime was inadmissible as it did
not go to disprove any of the facts set in issue by the accused. Rex v. Rodley, rog L. T. Rep. 476 (Eng. 1913).
Evidence is not inadmissible, simply because it is evidence of another and
distinct crime committed by the prisoner. Makin v. Atty. Gen'l, App. Cas.
65 (Eng. 1894). But it must be relevant to the issue. Rex v. Bond, 2 K. B.
389 (Eng. i9o6).. The exception to the rule that evidence of other crimes
committed by the accused shall not be admitted into evidence against him
has been invoked most often in cases of sexual offenses, as in the principal
case. Former acts of adultery may be introduced to rebut the presumption that the relations of the parties on the occasion in question were not
innocent. State v. Snover, 64 N. J. L. 65 (i879); Bass v. State, 103 Ga.
227 (1897). Indecent acts and intercourse with others are admissible if they
are all part of the same transaction. State v. Desmond, io Ia. 72 (1899).
In an indictment for assault with intent to commit rape, former liberties
taken with the person upon whom the assault was committed, are not admissible to show the intent of the prisoner. Rex v. Lloyd, 7 Car. & P. 318
(Eng. 1836). An assault upon another woman with intent to commit rape
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is not admissible to prove that the assault for which the indictment is laid
was with the same intent. People v. Bowen, 49 Cal. 654 (875) ; McAllister
v. State, 112 Wis. 496 (i9oI).
As to subsequent acts, it has been held that subsequent acts of adultery are
relevant to rebut the presumption that former compromising acts were innocent. Thayer v. Thayer, iox Mass. III (r869) ; Alsabrooks v. State, 52 Ala.
24 (1875). In some jurisdictions it seems to have been taken for granted
that there is no distinction as to relevancy, between former and subsequent
acts, criminal in their nature, but for the commission of which the defendant
has not been indicted. State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (i876); Crane v.
People, 65 Ill. App. 492 (i896). But the weight of authority seems to be
against this view, holding that, while prior criminal acts show the intent of
the accused to commit the act for which he is indicted, a subsequent act is
not admissible, for the crime may have first been consummated in the act
which is offered in evidence. People v. Fowler, io4 Mich. 449 (I895); People
v. Robertson, 84 N. Y. S. 4oi (I9O3).
CRIMINAL LAw-HomICIDE-SELF-DEFENSE-In a trial for homicide, the
court instructed the jury that if the defendant entered the conflict without
fault, retreating as far as he could with safety before he killed the decedent,
he could justify the killing upon the ground of self-defense. Held: The
court erred in requiring the defendant to quit the fight before he could maintain self-defense. State v. Lucas, 79 S.E. Rep. 674 (N. C. 1913).
The ancient English doctrine of retreat from a murderous assault requires the person assailed to withdraw as far as safety permits before he
may kill in self-defense. Hale, P. C. 483; Foster, C. L. 273. In America,
however, the rule has been greatly modified and in several jurisdictions, it
has been held that one who, being without fault, is murderously assailed, may
stand his ground and justifiably kill his assailant. People v. Lewis, II7 Cal.
186 (1897) ; Ragland v. State, III Ga. 211 (i9oo) ; State v. Gardner, 88 Minn.
130 (1905). On the other hand, in several jurisdictions, it has been held that
if the necessity of killing may be safely avoided by retreating, the party
assailed must retreat rather than kill. Common. v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868);
State v. Roberts, 63 Vt. 139 (x89o) ; Allen v. U. -S., 164 U. S.492 (1896).
All authorities agree that if retreat would not diminish the danger, he
may defend himself on the spot. State v. Roberts, supra; Common. v.
Breyesse, I6o Pa. 451 (1894). And if one is assailed in his own dwelling
house, he is not obliged to withdraw. Albertz v. U. S., 162 U. S.499 (i896) ;
Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142 (904). Many authorities go further, and allow
the assailed to stand his ground when le is attacked in the immediate
vicinity of his dwelling house. Naugher v. State, io5 Ala. 26 (189o) ; People
v. Kuehn, 93 Mich. 619 (1892). In a few jurisdictions this doctrine is carried still further, and one is allowed to stand his ground and kill an assailant
on his own premises, though not in the neighborhood of the dwelling house.
Baker v. Common., 93 Ky. 302 (1892) ; State v. Hudspath, i5o Mo. 12 (i899).
This appears to be the present doctrine of the- Supreme Court of the United
States. Beard v. U. S., 158 U. S.550 (1895). But in no case can a man justify a
failure to withdraw from the conflict before killing in self-defense where
he was the aggressor. Rowe v. U. S., 164 U. S.546 (1896); Gedye v. People,

i7o 111. 284 (1897).
EQUITY JURISDICTION-CREDITOR'S BILL-A creditor cannot maintain a bill
in equity to reach his debtor's assets, unless he has reduced his claim to
judgment and sued out execution, which has been returned nilla bona. Ryckman v. Manerud, 136 Pac. Rep. 826 (Ore. 1913).

The jurisdiction of equity to entertain suits in aid of creditors had its
origin in the narrow and limited scope of the common law remedies by
writs of execution. Such bills are usually filed by creditors to reach some
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equitable estate of the defendant, which is not liable to levy and sale under
an execution at law, or out of some property which has been put beyond
the reach of ordinary legal process by fraudulent assignment. As this remedy
is based upon the incapacity to obtain relief at common law, it is incumbent
upon the complainant, as a general rule, to show that he has exhausted his
common law remedies before resorting to equity. Newman v. Willetts, 52
Ill. ioi (i869); Bank v.-Kern, i93 Pa. 66 (i899). This is generally done
by showing that he has obtained a judgment, has issued execution, and that
there has been a return thereon of nulla bona. Jones v. Green, I Wall. 332
(U. S. 1862); Brinkeshoff v. Brown, 4 Johns. Cty. 671 (N. Y. 182o); Dornmeel v. Ward, IO8 Ill. 216 (1884). But this rule is not without exceptions. A
judgment followed by a fruitless execution is only evidence that the legal
remedies have been exhausted, and if the futility of resorting to process at
law is shown by other proofs, such as, for instance, an alleged fraudulent
issignment by an insolvent debtor of all his property, suing out execution
would be an idle ceremony, and would not be required before filing a bill.
Case v. Beauregard, ioi U. S. 688 (1879); Sage v. M. R. R. Co., 125 U. S.
361 (x887) ; Blair v. Steel Co., i59 Ill. 350 (i896) ; Flerschner v. Banks, 36
Ore. 553 (i9oo) ; Freeman v. Stuart, 119 Ala. i58 (i898). There is an exception to the rule even that a judgment is required; thus, in New Jersey
and Oregon, the lien created by an attachment duly levied upon the property
of the debtor is a sufficient foundation for the jurisdiction of a court of
equity to aid, by means of a creditor's suit, in removing fraudulent impediments or conveyances which prevent the creditor from laying hold of the
property and applying it to the payment of his debt. Francis v. Lawrence,
48 N. J. Eq. 5o8 (i89i); Dawson v. Sims, 14 Ore. 56i (i886).
EviDENcE-CoMPEENCY

OF

HUSBAND

AS

WITNESS-ALENATION

OF

alienaA"ECTIONs-In an action by the husband against a third party forhusband
tion of his wife's affections the question arose as to whether theHeld: As
could testify to the adultery of his wife with such third party. not later
the wife was not a party to the suit, and as such testimony could
be used against her in a prosecution for adultery, the husband was competent. Powell v. Strickland, 79 S. E. Rep. 872 (N. C. 1913).
Although this decision involved the interpretation of certain statutes,
view.
it is in accord with some authorities, while others take the opposite
The former decisions are based on the ground that the testimony of a witin
ness is not evidence for or against any one not a party to the proceeding
inwhich the testimony is given, and although such testimony may tend65toKan.
criminate the husband or wife, it is admissible. Roesner v. Darrah,
State v. Marvin, 35
599 (1902); Woods vs. Gledhill, 9 N. Y. S. 266 (i8go); St.
v. Bridgman, 49
N. H. 22 (857); State v. West, i8 Wis. 469 (i9o3);
Vt. 202 (1876).
the
The jurisdictions which hold that such evidence is inadmissible take
against
testify
to
wife
or
husband
allowing
not
for
reason
the
view that
that disthe other is based on public policy, and the underlying principleof issuch
testiturbance of marital 'elations would result from the admission
Me. 3o
mony. Cornelius v. Hambray, i'o Pa. 359 (892); St. v. Welch, 26 ii7
Ga.
(1846); People'v. Fowler, 104 lMich. 449 (1895) ; Graves v. Harris,
817 (1903) ; St. v. Wilson, 31 N. J. L. 77 (1864).
In any event, however, this rule is strictly limited to the relation of
of
husband and wife. Therefore there is no reason to withhold the testimony
1828) ;
a mere paramour or mistress. Batthews v. Galindo, 4 Bing. 61o (Eng.
Robertson v. State, 42 Ala. 5og (i868). Nor is there any privilege to persons
whose marriage is void. Hoxie v. State, 114 Ga. i9 (i9oI).
EVIDENcE-HEARSAY-To

show the weather conditions upon a particular

day, a diary was offered in evidence in which a stranger to the transaction,
in
since deceased, had recorded the weather each day. Held: The entries
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the book, as they were not made in the course of business, are inadmissible.
Arnold v. Hussey, 88 Atl. Rep. 724 (Me. 1913).

Book entries, to be admissible in evidence after the death of the person
making them, must be made in the regular course of business, with no interest to misrepresent, and before the controversy has arisen. Kennedy v.
Doyle, io Allen, 161 (Mass. 1865). The entry must be made in the way
of business and it is enough that the entry was made in connection with
the business, even though such record was not usual in similar occupations.
Fisher v. Mayor, 67 N. Y. 77 (1876). Business is interpreted very broadly,
any business or occupation is enough: lawyer, Leland, v. Cameron, 31 N. Y.
121 (1865); notary public, Nichols v. Webb, 8 Wheat. 337 (U. S. 1823);
physician, Bridgewater v. Roxbury, 54 Conn. 217 (I886); priest, Kennedy v.
Doyle, IO Allen, i6i (Mass. i865); insurance agent, Roberts v. Rice, 69 N. H.
472 (i899); railroad, Lumber Co. v. R. R., I68 Mich. 74 (igu). In England,
the person making the entry must owe, in addition, a duty to a third person
to do the particular thing to which the entry relates, and to record it at the
time when it is done. Smith v. Blakey, L. R. 2 Q. B. 332 (1867). The person
making the entry must have no interest to misrepresent, Lassone v. R. R.,
66 N. H. 354 (i8go) ; and the entry must be made at the time of the transaction, Patteschall v. Turford, 3 B. & Ad. 390 (Eng. 1832). In the principal case, the entries fulfill all the requirements except that they are not
made in the course of any business or under any duty. They were made
purely for personal interest and it was proper under the existing state of
the law to exclude the evidence. Weather reports have been admitted in
evidence, De Armond v. Neasmith, 32 Mich. 231 (1875); Hart v. Walker,
zoo Mich. 410 (1894), but in those cases the records were kept either in the
course of business or as official statements.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-The

de-

fendant, while in jail awaiting trial for murder, being unable to write English,
employed a prisoner scrivener to write a confidential letter to engage a lawyer
in his defence. Held: The letter, which the scrivener surrendered to a detective, was privileged and not admissible as evidence. State v. Loponio, 88
Atl. Rep. 1045 (N. J. 1913).

It is a universal rule that, where legal advice of any kind is sought from
a duly accredited professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, communications relevant to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at
his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by his legal
advisor, unless the protection is waived. Oliver v. McDowell, zoo Ill. App.
45 (i9o2); Ingerbran v. Weatherman, 79 Mo. App. 48o (1899); Kant v.
Kessler, 114 Pa. 603 (T887). But a third person, who secretly overhears a
verbal communication from a client to his attorney, may testify thereto.
Pulford's Appeal, 48 Conn. 247 (i88o); Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray, 519 (Mass.

1859). And it has been held that in the latter case the attorney also may
testify. Hummel v. Kistner, 182 Pa. 216 (1897); contra, Gabriel v. McMullin, 127 Iowa, 426 (i9O5). When a written confidential communication
comes into the possession of a third person, without treachery on the part
of the attorney, the former is competent to relate its contents. State v.
Mathers, 64 Vt. ioi (i89i). However, privilege attaches to the communication itself. Hoyt v. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 493 (1889). A communication made by
client to attorney in the presence.of another person is admissible, on the presumption that it was not intended to lie confidential. People v. Buchanan, 145
N. Y. x (1895).
Where as in the principal case there is a reasonable necessity for the
employment of an indirect method of transmission, any form of agency used
by the attorney or client is within the privilege. The principal has been
applied to interpreters, Du Barre v. Livette, N.
P. 77 (Eng. I791); messengers, Anderson v. Bank. L. R. 2 Chan. Div. 6 44 (Eng. 1876) ; letters, Reid
v. Langlois, I MacN. & G. 627 (Eng. 1849) ; Greenough v. Gaskell, I Myl.
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& K. 98 (Eng. 1833) ; stenographers, State v. Brown, 2 Mary. 38o (Del. 1899).
However, where a stenographer is not a medium of communication, he will
be allowed to testify concerning statements which he has overheard. Morton,
v. Smith, 44 S. W. Rep. 682 (Tex. 1898).
A communication to a clerk in a lawyer's office is within the rule previously stated. Taylor v. Forster, 2 C. & P. 195 (Eng. 1825). But a confidential statement made to student in law office is not privileged, unless he
was acting as clerk. Andrews v. Solomon, i Pet. C. C. 356 (U. S. 1816).
Even if the student is. supposed to be an attorney. Barnes v. Harris, 7
Cush. 576 (Mass. 1851).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATioNs-POLIcE PowER-Dun PRocEss OF LAw-The
City of Omaha, by an ordinance, granted the sole and exclusive right to remove all dead animals, not slain for human food, wherever found within its
limits. The grantee of this right filed a bill for an injunction to restrain
another garbage company from removing dead animals and appropriating
them to its own use. Held: The owner of a dead animal has a property interest in it. A city may provide for the removal of dead animals, but must
allow the owners a reasonable time in which -to attend to this themselves.
Whelan v. Daniels, 143 N. W. Rep. 929 (Neb. 1913).
It is within the police power of a municipality to protect the public health
and for this purpose to provide for the removal' of dead animals. The
owners' rights, however, do not cease at the death of their animals and no
city can authorize its contractor to take possession of and convert them to
his own use until the owners have had an opportunity to remove the carcasses themselves. Knauer v. City of Louisville, 45 S. W. Rep. 7o (Ky.
1898). A dead animal is not per se a nuisance. Underwood v. Green, 42
N. Y. 14o (1870). It is not possible under police regulation to take property
from one man and give it to another. State v. Morris, 18 S. Rep. 710
(La. 1895).
Such an ordinance as the one in question is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. City of Rich-

mond v. Caruthers, 103 Va. 775 (I9o5).-And a refusal by the municipal

authorities to permit the owner to remove the carcass of his own animal has
been held unjustifiable. Campbell v. District of Columbia, 1g App. D. C. 131
(19o2). If the owner, however, fails to remove the carcass within a reasonable time, a municipal corporation may authorize one its agent to deal with
it as a misance, detrimental to the public health. Schoen Bros. v. City of
Atlanta, 97 Ga. 697 (895).
NEGLIGENc-ACT OF Go--A boy slipped on an icy pavement and received

a permanent injury from coming in contact with an electric wire which had
been broken down by a severe snowstorm about twenty-six hours before.
The city's force of workmen had been steadily employed repairing broken
wires but, so great had been the destruction of the storm, they had not yet
had time to complete the work. Held: The'injury was caused by an act of
God, and there is no liability upon the city in the absence of proof of negligence contributing to produce the injury. Martin v. Philadelphia, 54 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 563 (1913).

This case illustrates a generally accepted principle of law. Mitchell v.
Light & Power Co., 45 S. C. r46 (1895). No one is responsible for that
which is merely the act of God, or inevitable accident. Chidester v. Consolidated Ditch Co., 59 Cal. 20i (1881). An act of God means an inevitable
accident without the intervention of man and the public enemies. Sonneborn
v. Southern Ry., 65 S. C. 502 (19o2). The act of God which will excuse
must be the proximate, and not the remote, cause of the loss. Merritt v.
Earle, 29 N. Y. 117 (1864). Not only this, but the better opinion is that
it must be the sole cause. Wolf v. American Express Co., 43 Mo. 421 (i86g).
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And if any negligence contributes as an active force in causing the injury,
the defendant is liable. Dunsbach v. Hollister, 49 Hun 352 (N. Y. 1888).
Although there is concurring negligence, however, no liability will be
imposed if the act of God of itself would have produced the injury. And
if the act of God is the proximate cause, the defendant is entitled to a
verdict regardless of whether or not he used ordinary care. Texas & N. 0.
R. Co. v. Anderson, 6I S. W. Rep. 424 (Tex. 19Ol).

NEGLIGENCE Res Ipsa Loquitur-The plaintiff's horse stepped on a rail of
the defendants' street car track and was instantly killed. There was evidence of a fatal electric shock upon the body of the horse and the presence
of electricity as manifested by a spark from the rail and the possibility of
a dangerous electric current in the rail due to a short circuit. Held: This
evidence raised an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. St. Louis v. Bay State St. Ry. Co., lO3 N. E.
Rep. 639 (Mass. 1913).

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied when the injury complained
of is such as would not ordinarily occur unless the defendant were negligent.
San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requeua, 224 U. S. 89 (1911); McDonough
v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 2o8 Mass. 436 (1911). It is based primarily on
probability and secondarily on considerations of expediency. Judson v.
Powder Co., 1o7 Cal. 549 (1895); Newark Electric Co. v. Ruddy, 62 N. J. L.
5o5 (88). If nothing further appears than that the person on the surface
of the highway was injured by contact with a broken live wire, the rule may
well be applied. Western U. Tel. Co. v. State, 82 Md. 293 (1896); Houston
Electric Light Co. v. Anderson, 73 Neb. 84 (19o5); Wood v. Wilmington City
Ry. Co., 64 Atl. Rep. 246 (Del. i9o5). But in Patterson Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh R. Co., 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 212 (i9O8), it was held that the maxim had
no application where the only evidence offered by the plaintiff was that the
trolley wire broke and fell to the street, killing the plaintiff's horse.
The principle of res ipsa loquitur is most frequently applied to those
cases in which the relation of passenger and common carrier exists, or in
which there has been an interference with the safety of the public highway.
Gleason v. Va., etc., R. R. Co., 140 U. S. 435 (1891); Trenton Passenger
Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 6o N. J. L. 219 (1897). And it has been established that
the falling of objects into a highway from a building, if unexplained, is prima
facie evidence of negligence. Byrne v. Bondle, 2 H. & C. 722 (Eng. 1863) ;
Mullen v. St. John, 51 N. Y. 56 (1874). The principle, however, is not
limited to these cases. For it is primarily the nature of the accident which
gives rise to the presumption. Association v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 367 (1896) ;
Springer v. Ford, 59 N. E. Rep. 953 (Ill. 19ol). It would seem that the
presumption of negligence should not be raised when the further fact is
present that physical forces under the control of an independent party contributed to the accident. Tompkins v. Railway, 66 Cal. 163 (1884).
NEGLIGENCE-STREET RAILWAYS-INJURY TO PEDESTRIAN-A woman cross-

ing a street corner diagonally was struck by the overhang of a street car as
it turned the corner. It appears that the motorman did not know that she
was dangerously near the car. Held: There was no negligence as the motorman did not have to anticipate. the approach of persons from the rear or side
of the car. Brightman v. Union St. Ry. Co., 1O3 N. E. Rep. 379 (Mass. 1913).
In general, a street railway company occupying the streets with its tracks
in common with the public must exercise due care to prevent accidents to
persons lawfully using the streets. Jones v. Greensburg St. Ry. Co., 9 Pa.
Super. Ct. 65 (898) : Rubinovitch v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 192 Mass. 119 (tgo6).
The motorman must anticipate reasonable dangers only; he does not have to
guard against dangers not reasonably to be expected. Chicago Ry. Co. v:
Biedeman, iO2 I1. App. 617 (1902). But the motorman after discovering a
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person in danger must use the highest degree of care to avoid injury. Louisville Ry. Co. v. Blaydes, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 668 (1899). Thus when a person
is seen by the motorman to be so placed that, if the car is started, he will
-be injured by the overhang of the car on the corner, and cannot avoid this
injury, the car must not be started until the person is in a place of safety.
Mittleman v. New York Ry. Co., 56 Misc. Rep. 599 (N. Y. 1907); Sichwartz
v. New Orleans Ry. Co., nio La. 534 (i9q2). But when the person can with
due care avoid being struck by the overhang of the- car, there is no duty on
the part of the company to look out for him. Widmer v. Street Ry. Co.,
i58 Mass. 49 (893) ; Hoffman v. Phila. R. T. Co., 214 Pa. 87 (io6). The
company, however, owes no duty to look out for persoris approaching the car
from the side or the rear, Kiley v. Boston El. Ry. Co., 2o7 Mass. 542 (igzi),
and therefore the principal case seems correctly decided.
PRoPmRTY-DEED--PAgius--BnxANs-The vendor of certain land gave the
purchaser a deed from the former's grantor, in which there was left a blank
for the name of the grantee. The purchaser, without the consent of the
vendor or of the grantor in the deed, inserted the name of a person to whom
he had contracted to sell the land. Held: The deed was void so far as the
purchaser himself was concerned. Osby v. Reynolds, 103 N. E. Rep. 556
( 1L
913).
It is a general rule that, as between the original parties, a deed which
does not contain the name of the grantee is void as a conveyance. Wunderlin v. Cadogan, 50 Cal. 613 (1875); Clark v. Butts, 73 Minn. 361 (1898) ; Bell
v. Kennedy, ioo Pa. 215 (1882). At common law, sealed authority was necessary to complete the instrument. Sheppard's Touchstone, p. 54; Hibblewhite
v. McMorine, 6 M. & W. 2oo (Eng. 1838). In some States, it has been held
that an authority to insert grantee's name must be in writing, though a seal
is not required. Adamson v. Hartman, 40 Ark. 58 (1882) ; Upton v. Archer,
41 Cal. 85 (1871). In a majority of States, however, at the present time, mere
parole authority is sufficient. Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534 -(0873); Wiley v.
Moor, 17 S. & R. 438 (Pa. 1828); Schintz v. McManamy, 33 Wis. 299 (1873).
When the instrument must be, executed by the grantor and not through an
agent, as in some States is the practice in a conveyance by a married woman,
blanks in the conveyance cannot be filled by a third person acting under oral
or even sealed authority. Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24 (U. S. 1864).
Where a deed with place for the insertion of the name of the grantee
left unfilled is executed and acknowledged and subsequently the blank is
filled contrary to the instructions of the grantor, the instrument is void as
to those having notice of the fraud. State v. Matthews, 44 Kan. 596 (i8go).
However, a ratification by the grantor following the unauthorized filling and
delivery-is binding. Donason v. Barbero, 23o Ill. 138 (1907). Some courts
hold that a delivery in blank is an implied authority to insert grantee's name,
South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89 (i865) ; Creveling v. Banta, i3" Iowa,
47 (i9o8) ; and that such a deed confers authority on the grantee to contract for the sale of the land and to fill in the name of his vendee. Logan
v. Miller, io6 Iowa, 51, (i898). As against a grantee who accepts a deed
with his name appearing therein in its proper place, and who does not know
of its insertion without authority by the agent of the grantor, the latter is
estopped to deny its validity. Phelps v. Sullivan, 140 Mass. 36 (1885) ; Pence
v. Arbuckle, 22 Minn. 417 (1$76). The same principle applies as against a
purchaser for value. Gray v. Lamb, 207 11. 258 (i9o4).
PROPEa.TY-REsTRAINT ON ALImENATIoN-Although a bond foc title was
inarked "not transferable to anyone," the assignee who has paid the instalments as they fell due may, upon tender of the balance due, demand conveyance to himself of the land, for even if the bond is similar to a deed with
restraint on alienation, such restriction would be repugnant and void. Cowart
v. Singletary, 79 S. E. Rep. i96 (Ga. 1913).
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The weight of authority is with this case, that a restraint on alienation
of an estate in fee is void, if alienation is absolutely prohibited or is limited
to a small class of persons. Attwater v. Attwater, z8 Beav. 330 (Eng. 1853).
There are dicta to the effect that a grantor may prohibit alienation to certain
persons. Jauretche v. Proctor, 48 Pa. 466 (1865) ; Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass.
362 (1892). Other cases have held that the slightest restriction is void.
Williams v. Jones, 2 Swan. 620 (Tenn. 1853) ; Murray v. Green, 64 Cal. 363
(1883). Restraint of alienation for a period of time has been allowed. Collins v. Clamorgan, 5 Mo. 273 (1838) ; Wallace v. Smith, 113 Ky. 263 (1902).

But this restriction must be limited to a reasonable period, Lawson v. Lightfoot, 27 Ky. L. R. 217 (1gos). Restraint for any period of time has been
held void, as repugnant to the estate granted. Latimer v. Waddell, 119 N. C.
370 (18g6); Mandlebaum v. McDonnell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874). A provision
that, before alienation the grantee should give a third person an option to buy
at a sum much less than the value of the property, was held to be a restraint
on alienation for the life of the third party and void. Rosher v. Rosher, 26
Ch. Div. 8oi (Eng. 1884). Restraint upon alienation of any estate in fee is
void, whether that estate be a freehold or leasehold in fee. DePeyster v.
Michael, 2o App. Div. 467 (N. Y. 1852). There may be restraint upon alienation of an estate not vested. Large's Case, 3 Leon. 182 (Eng- 1585).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-WHERE WIFE REFUSES TO JOIN-Specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate will be decreed though the wife
of the vendor refused to sign the deed, the vendee must accept the deed
signed by the husband alone and rely on its covenants to protect him from
the wife's dower, should it become a claim. Bartak v. Isvolt, io3 N. E.

Rep. 967 (Ill. 1913).

Illinois stands alone in the support of this extreme doctrine; for, the
vendor has contracted to convey an absolute fee simple, which he cannot do
if his wife refuses to join in the conveyance, since it would then be subject to her dower interest. Therefore, it would seem that the vendor should
not be entitled to a decree of specific performance against the vendee in such
case.
The more interesting question arises where the vendee seeks to compel the vendor to specifically perform his contract. All courts agree that
the vendee is entitled to the fee, subject to dower, if he is willing to pay the
full purchase money and accept the deed of his vendor with the wife joining.
Bennet v. Fowler, 2 Beav. 302 (Eng. 1839) : Barrett v. Ring, 2 Sm. & G. 43
(Eng. 1854); Morse v. Siebold, 147 Ill. 318 (1893); Cottrell v. Cottrell, 8I
Ind. 87 (1881); Brown v. Ward, iiO Ia. 123 (1899); Burls App., 75 Pa. 141

(1874). And, though formerly it had been held in a few cases that the husband would be required to procure his wife's joinder or go to jail for failure
to obey the decree, Hall v. Hardy, 3 P. Wins. 186 (Eng. 1733) ; Withars v.
Pinchard, cited in 7 Ves. Jr. 475 (Eng. 18o2); the courts now seem agreed
that the husband will not be decreed to make an absolute conveyance, requiring the wife's signature, the policy of this holding being that the wife is not
to be wrought upon by her love for her husband and sympathy in his situation to do that which her judgment disapproves as contrary to her own interest; nor is he to be tempted to use undue means to procure her consent.
Riesz's App., 73 Pa. 485 (1873); Barbour v. Hickey, 2 Dist. Col. App. 207
(1894). On the question, hovever, as to whether the vendee is entitled to a
deed signed by the husband alone, with a deduction from the purchase price
of the value of her dower interest, there is a conflict of opinion, There is a
general principle that where the vendor cannot make title to all he has contracted to convey, lie is not thereby relieved from specific performance as
far as in his power, but shall be compelled to execute his contract with a
reasonable abatement in the price for the deficiency. But many courts hold
that the right of dower of the widow is of such a contingent nature, depending as it does upon her surviving her husband, as on her continuance in life
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after his death, that no abatement 9f the price can be made which will be
just to both parties, without in effect making a new contract for them; and
they consider this a sufficient reason for refusing to make such decree, specific
performance being a matter of grace. Barbour v. Hickey, 2 Dist. Col. App.
207 (1894) ; Riesz's App., 73 Pa. 485 (1873) ; Hill v. Jones, 157 Pa. 433 (1893) ;
McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257 (1898); Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va.
895 (1893). Other courts follow the general principle above mentioned, and
require the husband to convey his interest, with abatement in the purchase
price to the extent of the value of the wife's dower interest; Wilson v.
Williams, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 8Io (Eng. 1857); Springle v. Shields, 17 Ala. 295
(185o); Martin v. Nevutt, 51 Ind. 34 (1877); Hession v. Linastruth, 96 Ia.
483 (1895); Walker v. Kelly, 91 Mich. 212 (1892); Sanborn v. Nockin, 20
Minn. 178 (1873); and in Wilson v. Williams, supra, Sir W. P. Wood, V. C.,
provided the following equitable method of abatement, viz., that -a sufficient
portion of the purchase money be set aside, allowing the vendor to receive
the interest during the joint lives of himself and his wife, and the principal
upon her decease.
If. the wife's refusal to release her dower was induced by the connivance
of her husband, it is generally held that the vendee is entitled to specific performance, with abatement of the price to the exterTt of the value of the wife's
dower right Young v. Paul, io N. J.Eq. 391 (i855).
SUanrysHIP-CoNTmBUTioN-Res Judicata-A suit was brought against
the principal and his sureties on an administrator's bond. The action was
dismissed as to two of the sureties on their demurrers thereto. In an action
by the third surety, against whom recovery was had and who had paid the
judgment, for contribution from the other two sureties, the defendants maintained that the matter was res judicata. Held: There was no res adjudicata.
Central Banking and Security Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co., 8o S. E. Rep. 121 (W. Va. 1913).
The dissenting judge, holding that the plaintiff was bound by the judgment of the first suit, said inter alia, "In a suit for contribution, by a surety
ho paid the judgment, there is involved the same identical issue that was
litigated in the suit by the creditor against the sureties, and that issue, having been determined by a final judgment, is resv judicata. It matters not that
the
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the same attitude. . . . Therefore, if a surety is not liable to the creditor,
he is under no obligation to help bear the burden; he is not then liable to
his co-surety." In other words, he treats contribution as resting on the same
principle as subrogation-a substitution of the surety, who paid, to the rights
of the creditor against his co-sureties.
The majority opinion states, however, what seems to be based on sounder
principles, that the right of contribution is not derived from, nor akin to,
subrogation; each is a distinct right given to the surety who pays. "Subrogation is an equitable principle through which the benefit of remedies is
obtained. As subrogation is not recognized at all by the law courts, the
recognition and enforcement of contribution in actions at law proves that
contribution is not dependent upon the right of subrogation." Moreover, as
the co-sureties are not adversary parties in the original action, to make the
former judgment conclusive would put the surety at a disadvantage and at
the mercy of the creditor who might permit all the sureties but one to get
fn;=i
" "
away.
In accord with the majority decision are the decisions in the Ohio courts.
Camp. v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio 337 (187o); Crory v. Parks, 18 Ohio i (i868);
Koelsch v. Mixer, 52 Ohio 207 (1894). Contra,and in favor of the dissenting
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opinion, are Cross v. Scaboro, 6 Baxt. 134 (Tenn. 1873) : Ledoux v. Durrive,
io La. Ann. 7 (1855); Hood v. Morgan, 47 W. Va. 817 (Igoo), apparently
overruled by the principal case.
TRUSTS-DEFAULTING

TRUSTEE-DECLARATION

OF

TRusT-The

executor

and trustee of an estate misappropriated trust funds. He entered every such
sum in an account book and against the entry inserted the word Ecc., which
was an'abbreviation for the name of his house. After his death the other
trustees of the estate claimed a priority on his house on the ground that
the entries created a valid charge on the house for the amounts the testator
had appropriated. Held: Where a declaration of trust is relied on the court
must be satisfied that a present irrevocable declaration of trust has been
made and that the declarant portrayed an irrevocable intention to declare
himself a trustee. Re Cozens; Green v. Brisley, log L. T. Rep. 3o6
(Eng. 1913).
Three things must concur to raise a trust; sufficient words to create it,
a definite subject, and a certain or ascertained object; and to these requisites may be added another, viz., that the terms of the trust should be
sufficiently declared. Bispham's Eq., 65, citing Cruwys v. Colman, 9 Ves. 323
(,Eng. 18o4) ; Knight v. Boughton, ii Cl. & F. 513 (Eng. 1843). In the principal case the first and last requisites are lacking. It will be observed that
no notice to the cestui que trust was given and while this is unnecessary to
the validity of a voluntary trust as against the declarant, if it is otherwise
perfectly created, Roberts v. Loyd, 2 Beav. 376 (Eng. 184o) ; Otis v. Beckwith, 49 Ill. 121 (I868), it may become a fact of importance in determining
whether the trust is perfectly created or not. Beatson v. Beatson, 12 Sim.
281 (Eng. 1841). So, in the principal case the court held that the fact that
the testator kept silent raised a strong inference against an intention to make
an appropriation irrevocable.
However, it is not essential to the validity of a trust of personal property that it should be irrevocable; a right of revocation may be expressly
reserved: Deckerson's App., 115 Pa. 198 (1886) ; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149
(i891). Although the power of revocation is reserved, the trust is as good
and effectual as if irrevocable, until the power is exercised. 'Van Cott v.
Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45 (1887); Seamon v. Harnan, 192 Mass. 5 (9o6);

Lines v. Lines, supra.
TRuSTS-JDGMENTs-LIEN-REsULLTING TRuSTs-The lien of a judgment

creditor is subject to a resulting trust of which the judgment debtor is
trustee, although the creditor had no knowledge or means of knowledge of
the trust under which the land was held. Case Machine Co. v. Walton Trust
Co., 136 Pac. Rep. 769 (Okla. 1913).
In accordance with the rule in the principal case, it has been held that
if the holder of the legal title is mere trustee or if, for any reason. he holds
the bare legal title for the benefit of another, an execution sale against him
transfers no interest whatever in the property so held. English v. Law, 27
Kan. 242 (1882); Wright v. Franklin Bank, 5g Ohio, 8o (1898). For the
judgment creditor can take only the debtor's interest in the property, that
is, his bare legal title. Brady v. Carteret Co.. 67 N. J. Eq. 641 (19o4) ; Wells
This general rule has, however, been
v. Van Dyke, iO6 Pa. iii (1884).
somewhat modified by Recording Acts. In the sale on execution of realty,
the purchaser takes the record title free of all encumbrances which are not
recorded in accordance with the acts. Johnson v. Equitable Co., 114 Ga.
6o4 (9ol) ; Lee v. Bermingham. 30 Kan. 312 (1883). It has been held that
the execution creditor, who purchases the property and satisfies the judgment
takes title free of a previous unrecorded conveyance. Rouse v. Caton, 168
Mo. 288 (19oi) : contra. Harker v. White. 22 Wash. 45 (9oo) : Termant v.
Watson. 58 Ark. 252 (1893). Where, however. the property is subject to
equities not within the Recording Acts, the judgment lieu is not binding on
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those equities. Colyar v. Bank, 1O3 Tenn. 723 (I89). The purchaser at a
sale of such property with notice or constructive notice of such equities takes
subject to the equities. Cote v. Langdon, 226 Pa. 34o (igio) ; May v. Cleland,
117 Mich. 45 (1898). This situation sometimes arises when judgment has
been entered against a devisee, against whom the estate has some claim. Pinckney v. Pinckney, 114 Ia. 44i (igoI).
At common law, no equitable estate could be reached under a fi. fa.
Lyster v. Dolland, i Ves. Jr. 431 (Eng. 1792); Potter v. Couch, I41 U. S.
296 (i8go). By §io of the Statute of Frauds in England, the interest of a
cestui que trust was made liable to execution, but this was strictly construed
and limited to a mere dry trust, where the cestui could compel conveyance
to himself of legal title. Hull v. Greenhill, 4 Barn. & Ald. 684 (Eng. i82i);
Lynch v. Utica Insurance Co., I8 Wend. 236 (N. Y. 1837). No statute of
-this kind has been adopted in Massachusetts where no equitable estates can be
reached by execution, Russell v. Lewis, 2 Pick. 5o8 (Mass. 1824). In some
States, equitable estates have been subjected to execution without any statute.
Atwater v. Reed, 45 Minn. 341 (i89i); Rickert v. Madeira, i Rawle, 325
(Pa. 1829). In Pennsylvania all possible contingent titles in land, accompanied with an estate, property, or real interest in the land, whether that
interest be legal or equitable, are subject to execution. Rickert v. Madeira,
supra. In other States, the matter is regulated by statute, and depends entirely upon the statute of each particular State. Under statutes like the
English Act, it has been held that resulting trusts are included in the terms
of the statute. Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475 (1857) ; Dunnetra v. Cox,
24 Mo. 167 (1857). Other jurisdictions have held that resulting trusts were
not included in the terms of the Act. Everett v. Raby, io4 N. C. 479 (889).
TRUSTS-VOLUNTARY-A husband deposited corporate stock with a trustee
to secure the performance of an agreement to pay his wife in lieu of alimony
a stipulated income during her life, and at her death to pay the income to
the daughters of the marriage. The wife died "and the husband refused to
pay the income to the daughters and replevies the stock. Held: The trust is
valid and enforceable even though it was voluntary as to the daughters, being
an executed trust, and therefore irrevocable. Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust
Co. of N. Y., IO3 N. E. Rep. 7o6 (N. Y. 1914).
This case is in accord with the prevailing rule. The necessity of a valuable consideration to support a trust depends upon whether the trust is
executed or executory, it being the rule that equity will no more enforce a
voluntary executory agreement to create a trust, than it will perfect a defective gift; but where there is an executed voluntary promise to establish a trust and nothing further remains to be done by the grantor to transfer
title, the relation of trustee and cestui que trust is established and it will be
enforced. Nichols v. Emery, iog Cal. 323 (1895) ; Van Pott v. Prentice, 1o4
N. Y. 45 (1887); Dennison v. Goehring, 7 Pa. 175 (1847); Rick's Appeal, io5
Pa. 528 (1884) ; Bennett v. Littlefield, 177 Mass. 294 (igol); Landon v. Hutton, 50 N. J. Eq. 5oo (1892). An executed trust is one in which the limitations and trusts are fully and perfectly declared, while in an executory one
they are imperfectly declared, and the donor's intention is expressed so
generally that something not fully declared is required to be done in order
to complete the trust. Smith Est., i44 Pa. 428 (I89i) ; Martling v. Martling,
55 N. J. Eq. 771 (1897); Watson v. Payne, 143 Mo. App. 721 (igio); Perry
Trusts (6th Ed.), §359.
In the absence of fraud; mistake or undue influence a trust completely
created and containing no express power of revocation is not revocable by the
creator without the beneficiary's consent, whether based on valuable consideration or merely voluntary, provided in the latter case it is executed. Lovett
v. Farnum. 169 Mass. i (1897) ; In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112 (9o4) ; Sturgeon
v. Stevens, 186 Pa. 350 (1898); Potter v. Trust Co., igg Pa. 36o (igoi);
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Fry v. Mercantile Trust Co., 207 Pa. 64o (19o4).

The fact that there is a

power of revocation in a trust instrument does not prevent the creation of
a valid trust. Leaman v. Harman, 192 Mass. 5 (19o6); Brown v. Spohr, i8o
N. Y. 2Ol (19o4).
WILLS-CAN THE SLAYER OF THE TESTATOR CLAIM AS A BENEFICIAIiY?-

A claimant under the testator's will was tried for causing his death, and convicted of manslaughter. Held: The claimant cannot in any way benefit from
the crime which she has committed. In re Hall, io9 L. T. Rep. 587 (Eng. 1913).
The decision in this case was based on that of Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n, I Q. B. 147 (Eng. 1892), and the reason given was public
policy. The jurisdictions of the United States differ decidedly upon this
question. The majority appear to hold that where no express provision has
been made by statute to bar the criminal heir or devisee, his position is not
altered by his act. Owens v. Owens, ioo N. C. 240 (1888) ; McAllister v. Fair,
84 Pac. Rep. 112 (Kan. i9o6). Two cases have been decided in accordance
with the English view as expressed in the principal case. Riggs v. Palmer,
115 N. Y. 5o6 (1889), and Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb. 6I (i89i). The
latter, however, was disapproved on rehearing in 41 Neb. 631, and the New
York rule has also been altered, although the same result is accomplished.
Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149 (1896).
The decisions of the English courts seem to ignore the Statute of Wills,
which provides for revocation of wills in certain specified ways, among which
the killing of the testator or intestate by the devisee or heir has no place.
Public policy is the reason assigned for this step and no further explanation
is offered. The American cases hold that this statute is all-powerful with
respect to such circumstances and, inasmuch as it makes no express provision,
the will or intestate laws must be carried out and the legal title to the property vested in the devisee or heir. So far this reasoning is sound, but the
majority stop here and leave the criminal with the fruits of his crime. The
correct view is expressed in Ellerson v. Westcott, supra. There it is said that
the will cannot be set aside, but equitable relief may be obtained and the
criminal be treated as a constructive trustee of the property for the other
heirs of the deceased.

